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Introduction
For too long, economists  have described the 2008 events in the U.S. and Europe as a financial  
crisis. Like on many occasions, economists were not wrong, but not right either. The real crisis did 
not happen in a single year, but was the result of years of benign neglect to what happened to the 
individual’s household own equity level: the savings used to help acquire a home for one’s own use. 
Few individual households can afford to buy a home outright out of their own savings. They use 
outside equity: borrowed funds. In 2008 in the U.S., 53 million households had a mortgage out of 
some 80 million home owners. 
The relationship between outside and own equity is often not fully understood. Outside equity has 
the capacity to help increase the volume of new housing starts,  but it  has also the capacity  to 
increase house prices over and above the general inflation level: the CPI level. If incomes keep pace 
with the CPI level -and after 2008 that has been a big if- than an increase in house prices above the 
CPI level leads to the situation that the value of an unchanged percentage of savings out of incomes 
becomes worth less in purchasing power to acquire a home. Own equity suffers, but bankers, who 
intermediate on behalf of outside home equity providers, recorded a positive gain for outside equity 
holders as asset prices increased. This contradiction is based on what incomes and savings out of 
incomes can buy and what asset prices reflect: outside equity allocated to both a volume and a price 
increase. Banks base their actions on their own customers, not on those who have not even entered 
the  housing market,  but  wish  to  do  so.  They also base  themselves  on  asset  prices,  sometimes  
forgetting  the  effects  of  house price  increases  over  CPI  levels,  caused by their  own collective 
behaviour. In 2005-2006 65.5% of all lending for home purposes in the U.S. ended up in price 
increases of homes. If one adds to this the Fed’s reaction of increasing base interest rates from 1% 
in June 2004 till 5.25% by July 2006, than such action did not punish the bankers, but it punished  
the own equity providers and reduced their  incomes flows, especially those on variable interest 
rates,  like  the  90% of  sub-prime  mortgage  holders.  It  also  reduced the  number  of  prospective 
buyers. In the U.S. over the period 2008-2012 5.4 million home owners lost their homes and their  
equity in their home due to repossessions.
Europe got heavily involved in the American income and housing crisis as banks, pension funds and 
individuals from Europe provided the outside equity, by buying up U.S. mortgage backed securities.
The re-balancing period has taken well over 5 years with very heavy losses on savings, including a 
huge increase in government debt on both sides of the Atlantic. Individual households had to restore 
their own income and savings levels, which to some extent they have succeeded to do in the U.S., 
and to a lesser extent in the U.K. but in the Euro area such re-balancing is only in its very early 
stages.
This article focuses on the relationships between incomes and assets, on own and outside equity and 
on economic savings -those that help output and employment growth- and financial ones, which do 
not do so.
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1. Individual household’s incomes, savings and asset prices
1.1 The purchasing power of savings
Income developments of individual households are often compared to inflation levels: the changes 
in prices of goods and services as measured with the help of the CPI inflation index. In an equal 
measure, savings -the postponement of consumption till a future date- could be measured against 
price and volume changes. The latter changes are reflected in the price movements of homes; of 
shares and bonds after the initial  listing dates and of the volume increases in government  debt 
levels.
In  a  period  when  the  CPI  inflation  level  rises  faster  than  the  average  income  of  individual  
households in an economy, it is widely accepted that the value of the income flow is depreciated 
against  the  values  of  the  prices  on offer  in  an economy.  Such depreciation  occurs  both to  the 
internal value of a currency as expressed in the local currency and to the purchasing power of the 
currency as expressed in foreign currency terms. Individual households lose the ability to buy the 
same package of goods and services as in previous years. The loss is particularly painful for those 
on low income levels, including the young and the unemployed as well as those households who 
have no savings. This depreciation of the values of incomes can be called the income depreciation 
factor.
The  same  depreciation  effects  apply  to  savings.  Savings  can  also  lose  their  purchasing  power 
through events linked to the price developments in homes, shares and bonds and the volume effects 
of increased government debt. It specifically applies to:
• The increase in house prices over and above the CPI inflation levels, provided that incomes 
do keep up with the CPI inflation level;
• The increase in share and bond prices after the initial transfer of funds when companies list 
their shares or bonds on the stock exchanges;
• The increase in government debt outstanding after a year, if the use of government funds 
does not create its own cash-flow, but has to be recovered from the individual households’ 
future income levels.
All these three factors can cause the savings depreciation factor.
1.2 The savings depreciation factor and home values.
In a paper recently published1 called: “Financial crisis, economic crisis and individual households’ 
income and savings crisis” I drew attention to the fact that 65.5% of all outside equity used to buy 
homes in the U.S. during 2005-2006 was not used to increase the volume of new housing starts but 
to increase the prices of existing homes. Every year from 1997 till 2006 house prices in the U.S. 
increased above the CPI inflation level, but the pace of such increase changed dramatically from 
2002. The median income level in nominal terms moved up from $41,186 in 2000 till $47,262 in 
2006, which was slightly below the CPI inflation level changes. From a house buying perspective,  
in order to have maintained the same purchasing power of the savings out of such income, one 
would have needed a median income level of $63,246 in 2006. The savings depreciation factor was 
33.8% over  the whole period  2000-2006.  The purchasing power capacity  of  the same level  of 
savings out of increased incomes in order to buy a home had dropped by nearly 34% over this 
period. In 2006 the $47.262 income level per household could no longer afford the same own equity 
1 http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53122/ 
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level to buy a home.  One needed a 34% higher savings level than in 2000. Of course, income 
developments and savings requirements to provide the own equity for buying a home clashed. This 
situation was made worse by the Fed when it increased its base rate. This rate went up from 1% in 
June 2004 till 5.25% by July 2006. The base rate stayed at this level till August 2007. Such interest 
rate  increase  had  a  dissimilar  effect  on  outside  equity  and  own equity  providers.  Own equity 
providers, who had variable mortgage interest rates for their outside equity, had to pay substantially 
more out of their incomes to support the outside equity providers; a transfer of income they could ill 
afford. This was made worse as 90% of sub-prime mortgages ($1.1 trillion out of the total $10 
trillion national home mortgage portfolio) had been started up during 2004-2006 with a low two 
year  fixed  interest  rate  and  variable  rates  there  after.  Sub-prime  mortgages  were  granted  to 
individual households who least could afford a mortgage. 
Outside equity providers initially benefitted from the increased base rate, as did the banks. The 
latter profited even more as they sold off a substantial share of their credit risks to other outside  
equity providers as mortgage backed securities, including a major quantity to European savers. 
The savings depreciation factor was not incorporated into banks’ credit judgments and neither was 
it reflected in their annual profit and loss statements. Mark-to-market valuations of homes were 
wide  off  the  mark  as  they  did  take  no  account  of  the  increased  risks  to  the  income  level  of 
individual households, due from both the savings depreciation factor and the raised interest charges.
The bubble started to burst when on August 9, 2007 BNP Paribas suspended three investment funds 
in  mortgage  backed securities  as:  “a complete  evaporation  of  liquidity”  had occurred.  Savings 
losses to outside equity providers started to accumulate.
It has been a striking fact that about 5.4 million home owners lost their home over the period 2008-
2012 out of the around 50 million home owners who had a mortgage. This reflects nearly 11% of all 
home owners who had a mortgage and is close to the 12% of sub-prime mortgages granted as a 
percentage of the total national home mortgage portfolio. Over the period 2006-2011 it should be 
noted that house prices dropped by 28.9% in value and $6.6 trillion in actual amounts. Only in 2012 
did the tide  turn in  the U.S.,  once individual  households had had the chance to  pay down the 
outstanding principal amount of home loans by $1.2 trillion. They did this over the period 2008-
2012. Over the period 2007-2013  8.714 million homes were built less as compared to the 2005 
level of new housing starts. Not only was the savings depreciation factor not taken into account in 
the build up to the individual income and savings crisis, it also led to savings losses far higher  
(more than five times higher to be precise) than the outside equity amounts provided to the sub-
prime mortgage participants.
Some further observations. Banks did not properly account for the savings depreciation factor as 
they  only  considered  their  own client  base.  They did  not  take  into  account  the  effects  of  the 
collective actions of all banks providing the outside equity element responsible for the increase in 
house  prices.  They  also  transferred  risks  to  other  outside  equity  providers,  so  that,  narrowly 
speaking, an individual bank had lowered the risks on its own books. Of course, the increased risks 
to  the  income  levels  of  individual  households  continued  unabatedly,  the  higher  the  savings 
depreciation factor had become.
Another observation is that those on low income levels, below the median income level, suffer the 
most  when the savings depreciation factor goes up and subsequently comes down again.  Their 
incomes  are proportionally  more  affected  than those incomes  above the median  income levels. 
Hence it is so essential that the savings depreciation factor is acted upon when it occurs and that the  
5
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low income earners have a chance to reduce their risks over their income by having a 30 year fixed 
rate mortgage granted: the very reason that Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac were set up in the past.
Finally the policy of benign neglect accepted by both the U.S. Congress and the Fed has not worked 
well for the U.S., but also not for Europe as the contagion spread through the international capital 
flows.
1.3 The savings depreciation factor and shares and company bonds
Savings -households’ equity-  are not only allocated to purchase a home.  They are also used to 
finance companies. The transfer of financial resources to a company takes place when a company 
lists their shares or bonds. From the moment that a company share or bond is listed, new savings are 
allocated to increase the share or bond price. Savings are lost when an individual household actually 
sells the share or bond below the issue price or below the market price for which the shares or  
bonds were bought.
The savings transferred to the company sector do represent real asset values. They represent bricks 
and mortar, equipment, but also the human skills to create new products and services, to sell more,  
to improve operations and to compete effectively against other companies, both domestically and 
abroad. What the savings transfer does not guarantees is that there is a sufficient level of demand 
for the goods and services of all companies: the macro state of an economy.
The link between an individual household’s income and savings level and the company sector is 
more complex than in the case of owning one’s own property. Many individual households together 
own a company. Ownership is quite often exercised indirectly through pension funds and mutual 
funds.  Therefore  the  effects  of  the  volumes  of  savings  on  the  price  of  shares  and  bonds  are 
somewhat more uncertain. Does the price of a share go up because the company is expected to 
create more income or does the price go down because of a lack of demand in an economy? There 
are individual but also collective reasons for share price movements. Irrational exuberance is a well 
known factor in the share markets.
If one uses the Balance Sheet of Households and Nonprofit Organizations as published by the Fed2 
over the period 2000-2006 and one adds up the values of corporate equities, mutual fund shares, life 
insurance reserves and pension fund reserves in the year 2000 and 2006, one will see that the values 
increased from $20.84 trillion at year end 2000 till $27.64 trillion per end 2006. This reflects a 
nominal increase of 32.49%. Median incomes moved up by 14.75% over the same period. The Dow 
Jones Industrial index moved up from 10,788 per end December 2000 till 12,510 per end December 
2006 an increase of 15.96%. One cannot draw a very specific conclusion out of these data because a 
number of elements cannot easily be assessed. They are the distribution of the savings over equities 
and bonds. This allocation can change on a daily basis. Secondly there are payments received from 
dividends and interest over the share and bond portfolios over the whole period 2000-2006 and 
thirdly the pension and life insurance companies pay out benefits to retirees or other beneficiaries.
Notwithstanding  such inaccuracies  it  seems that  the  price  effect  of  the  share  portfolio  did  not 
deviate very far from the income growth over the same period. For the bond portfolio the 10 year 
government bond rate at the end of 2000 did not deviate very much from the same 10 year bond rate 
at the end of 2006, which would more or less apply to company bonds also. If anything bond prices 
would have shown a very slight increase in value over these six years. All in all the share prices and 
the bond prices developments over the six year period did not show any substantial deviation from 
2 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1r-5.pd
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the income growth over this period. This implies that the savings depreciation factor was likely to 
be very small as compared to the house price developments. 
Again a final uncertain factor is how much bank credit was involved to fund an increase in share 
prices. This factor is mitigated as banks generally keep a close eye on asset prices of shares and 
bonds and on outstanding margins. If margins are exceeded, a cash call follows quickly and while 
such margin trading can add to the volatility in the share markets, it normally is soon corrected by 
cash calls or sales of shares.
1.4 The savings depreciation factor and outstanding government debt levels
Recently the U.S. government published its balance sheet for fiscal 20123 which was reported by 
the American Enterprise Institute: assets $2.748 trillion and liabilities $18.849 trillion. Of the assets 
about  $1  trillion  were  loans  outstanding  and  $855  billion  property,  plant  and  equipment.  The 
difference of $16.1 trillion is a massive consumer loan to be repaid by individual households. It will 
affect own equity and incomes values for all U.S citizens over a very long period of time.
Governments generally, but also in the particular case of the U.S., do not accumulate many assets. 
In the U.S. the loans granted imply that future incomes of the involved individual households will 
be reduced by the level of repayments of such loans. For a government they are a financial asset and 
could be offset against their own liabilities, were it not that the doubtful debtor level of such loans is 
uncertain, but the government’s own debt level is not.
Other than in the case of homes, the price effect of government assets is not very relevant. This 
brings one to the future income effects on individual household’s incomes from an increased level 
of government debt. This will affect all households in the U.S. and beyond.
In  the  U.S.  over  the  period  2000-2006 the  government’s  outstanding debt  level  went  up from 
$5.674 trillion in fiscal year 2000 till $8.506 trillion in fiscal year 2006, an increase of 49.9%. The 
median income level over the same period went up by only 14.75% over the same period. The 
funding of U.S. government debt has been partly funded by foreign buyers of U.S. government 
debt, but the repayment of these debts is clearly the responsibility of individual households in the 
U.S. If one takes into account the increase of the number of households in the U.S. from 104.705 
million in 2000 till  114.384 million in 2006 than the government debt per individual household 
moved up from $54,190 in 2000 till $74,363 in 2006 an increase of 37.2%.
U.S. government debt is all funded by outside equity, some of it originating from abroad. It means 
that future savings of U.S. individual households are mortgaged for a period much longer than the 
usual repayment period of a home mortgage loan. Government debt outstanding for longer than a 
year has no economic value unless a cash flow is created from a specific government investment 
which, based on an outside contract, pays for the government expenditure. Government debt has a 
financial value as will be explained later. Its economic impact arises when individual households’ 
savings and incomes are affected through increased taxation levels. Even before the financial crisis 
of 2008, if in 2006 the U.S. government would have chosen a 70 year equal instalment repayment  
period, the repayment element alone would have lowered the value of the median income level by 
$1062 per household. This would mean a permanent lowering of the value of income per household 
over their life time by 2.25% and this reflects the principal amount of the debt only.
3 http://www.aei-ideas.org/2013/01/usa-inc-s-balance-sheet-assets-2-7-trillion-liabilities-18-8-trillion/
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The U.S. government debt situation has worsened considerably since 2006. In 2012 the nominal 
median income level in the U.S. was $51,017 or a 7.94% increase over the 2006 level, while the 
U.S. government debt level practically doubled over the same period from $8.506 trillion in 2006 
till $16.066 trillion in 2012 or an 88.9% increase. According to the U.S. Debt Clock4 government 
debt per capita now stands at $54,169 and per taxpayer at $150,525. What this all means is that the 
value of future savings and of incomes is severely affected by the rapid increase in U.S. government 
debt; already very seriously between 2000 and 2006, but even more since 2006. The savings and 
income depreciation factor is substantial. The cash flow to service this debt has to come totally out 
the income levels of individual households, directly or indirectly, reducing the future purchasing 
power of savings and incomes of individual households.
2 The accumulation of macro-economic errors
The period of benign neglect of U.S house price increases started from 1997 and lasted well into 
2006. The neglect was that neither the U.S. government nor the Fed seemed to realise and to act 
upon the fact that house prices were rising faster than the CPI inflation index and also faster than 
the  median  level  incomes.  The  individual  households’  savings  depreciation  factor  was  not 
measured; it was not incorporated in the lending decisions by the banks as banks focussed only on 
their  own client  base  rather  than  on what  all  banks did  together.  The latter  was  to  create  the  
situation that in 2005 and 2006 65.5% of all new home mortgage lending was used to raise house 
prices above the CPI inflation index. U.S. banks were very pleased with the fact that they could sell  
about  half  of  their  total  national  home mortgage  portfolio  -about  $5 trillion  out  of  a  total  $10 
trillion-  to  outside  equity  providers  through  the  mortgage  backed  securitisation  process.  A 
substantial  share  of  this  was taken up by European  savers.  As risks  were  -in  a  narrow sense- 
transferred to others, U.S. banks reported inflated profit levels. They based such profit assessments 
on two elements: the increased home values as compared to outstanding loans and the transferred 
risks. 
Collectively  U.S.  banks  were  themselves  responsible  for  the  increased  home  values  over  CPI 
inflation levels.  Collectively the risks to the world’s individual households as the providers of the 
outside equity could not be laid off. Ultimately the financial crisis occurred because the Fed and 
others regarded the housing market as a supply and demand market. They should have considered 
that the housing market is an income and savings affordability market.  After all the housing stock 
does not need replacement all at once; new homes are to last at least about 100 years and what is 
needed is a steady flow of new homes; in the case of the U.S. about 1.6 million new housing starts 
per annum. To keep new homes within reach for all those who aspire to become home owners made 
and still makes great economic sense.
2.1 From boom to bust
Individual households can not be blamed for taking out home mortgages. They do no control the 
collective actions of banks of increasing the volume of outside equity to the extent that 65.5% of the 
new mortgage amounts were used to inflate house prices over the CPI inflation level. However 
individual households suffered the consequences. The most immediate effect was that 21.4 million 
households  were put  under  immense  financial  pressure  as  foreclosure proceedings  were started 
against them over the period 2004-2012. This represented more than 4 out of every 10 mortgage 
holders in the U.S. Secondly 5.4 million individual households or more than 1 out of every 10 lost 
their home through repossession. The reaction of individual households was to repay $1.2 trillion 
4 http://www.usdebtclock.org/
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from the peak of outstanding home mortgages in 2007 of $10.549 trillion till $9.373 as per the end 
of the third quarter 2013.
The banks also changed their position. Of course the securitisation process was stopped. Lehman 
Brothers  went  bankrupt.  Other  banks  around  the  world  went  bankrupt.  Banks  did  no  longer 
stimulate individual households to take out home mortgages. The substantial drop in house prices 
since 2008 also caused banks to lose out. Their equity bases needed replenishments.
Outside equity savers were also punished. Both in Europe and in the U.S. savers lost substantial 
amounts as a consequence of the lack of management over the collective of banks. The guidance of 
the credit rating agencies did not help either as their credit judgement skills were just as poor as 
those of the bankers. The bankers were the ones who paid these agencies for their credit judgments.
The savings which remained in the system after the losses: deposits, share values and the outside 
equity  provided  to  fund  outstanding  government  debt  were  hit  by  another  income  shock: 
quantitative easing. The latest balance sheet of the Fed (23rd January 2014) showed that it had on its 
books:  $2.122  trillion  in  U.S.  government  securities  and  $1.532  trillion  in  mortgage  backed 
securities. The Fed is the only institution in the U.S. which can pay in U.S. dollars with dollars 
which have not been saved out of incomes. The effect on savers has been substantial. Incomes from 
all outstanding U.S. treasuries were substantially lowered. The indication of a tapering of additional 
tranches of quantitative easing has already caused large cash withdrawals from emerging market 
economies. The total values of shares held by U.S individual households have increased by 61.9% 
between 2009 and the end of the third quarter 2013. The nominal GDP value has gone up from 
$14.418 trillion in 2009 till an estimated $16.773 trillion for 2013, an increase of 16.3%. It seems 
that the next bubble is appearing in share prices as they are racing ahead of incomes and savings. 
QE could well be responsible for this re-allocation of savings.
2.2 The real economy
If the world was a simple place, financial sector transactions would remain separate from real sector 
activities.  However  in  the  real  world  whatever  happens  in  the  financial  world  has  substantial 
repercussions in the real world. In 2008 and following years house prices dropped, share prices took 
a battering and individual households tightened their  purse strings in order to protect their own 
equity positions  in their  homes.  All  this  led to  companies  getting more careful  due to reduced 
demand  levels.  Large  companies  started  to  accumulate  large  sums  of  cash  holdings  and  small 
companies had more difficulties in obtaining credits. Unemployment levels went up dramatically 
and the income growth of those still in work fell below CPI inflation levels. Government deficits 
multiplied. Consumption, investments and government expenditure over tax receipts all went in one 
direction, south. 
Based on all these facts, how can economic growth be restored without having to go through the 
very lengthy process of adjustments by individual households only. The remarkable element in the 
adjustment process has been that banks have been helped, that governments have benefitted from 
quantitative easing through a sharply reduced costs of funds, the wealthy have generally benefitted 
as they could move their savings into hedge funds and other vehicles and to other countries. The 
man in the street has lost out, often through joblessness or through income growth below inflation 
levels and of course on the value of his home as house prices have come down. People entering into 
retirement have suffered as their savings levels were worth much less in annuity terms as QE had 
lowered the interest rates by a substantial margin.
9
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My conclusion is that the problem started with the individual household’s income and savings crisis 
-the equity crisis- and that the solutions should be found for individual households. If done, the 
problems for banks and for governments would be less severe and lower unemployment levels will 
help many underprivileged to get back to earn an income.
3. Possible solutions
3.1. Introduction
In a paper: “Do savings promote or hamper economic growth? The Euro area example” 5  I made a 
distinction between savings which helped economic growth -the growth in output and employment- 
and savings that did not. I called the first category of savings: economic savings and the latter type: 
financial savings. In the case as illustrated above about the U.S. home market, it was made clear 
that  outside equity could help to increase the volume of new home starts  -an economic use of 
savings-, but it could also help to increase the price of existing homes to go up -a financial use of  
savings-. In this article I have set out the relationship between income and savings levels together  
with the asset (house) price developments and introduced the concept of the savings depreciation 
factor.
Prices of assets are closely related to the use and allocation of savings, but they are equally related  
to income growth patterns. The savings depreciation factor showed that, in the case of the U.S. 
housing markets, the income growth over the period 2000-2006 did not keep pace and thereby the 
savings level did not keep pace with the increased level of house price rises over the CPI inflation 
levels. Income and savings levels were at odds with the allocation of savings: the economic and 
financial use of such savings. The imbalance which occurred had all to do with the shift in savings 
from an economic use to a financial one. The solutions have all to do with measures which prevent 
such an imbalance occurring in the first place: addressing the benign neglect. It also has all to do 
with restoring the individual household’s own income flows: through output growth and a higher 
level of employment. One of the solutions proposed in the above paper is economic easing. Other 
solutions have to do how banks, pension funds and others play their role in the allocation process of 
savings. As the Euro area needs the most  re-adjustments yet,  the proposed solutions have been 
worked out for the Euro area.
3.2 Economic easing
Individual households do not save with the purpose of seeing their savings destroyed by negative 
returns. Their aim is to see the economy grow so that savings benefit from the increased economic 
activity both by increased output and increased income levels.
In the above it has been explained that, at times, there are large volumes of savings allocated to uses 
which do not help economies grow.
If one studies the saving rate of the collective of individual households in the Euro area it has varied 
somewhat around 13.5% of individual households’ income over the period since 2002. In the U.S. 
the accumulated net worth of individual households is about 4.5 times annual GDP. In the Euro area 
there are no recent precise data on this but with a savings rate of 13.5% over a longer period of 
time, the total net worth of Euro area individual households is likely to be below the U.S. level but 
highly likely to be a low multiple of the Euro area’s GDP.
5 http://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/52533.html
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Economic easing can be defined as the process of channelling savings away from the financial use 
and to its economic one.
In countries like The Netherlands the pension reserves stand at 156% of GDP and in other Euro area 
countries like France and Germany the insurance technical reserves are all very substantial.  The 
richer countries do not lack savings, but they do lack mechanisms to channel such savings to an 
economic use.
An economic easing scheme can be applied domestically as well as cross border between countries 
in the Euro area.
3.2.1 Example of a domestic scheme: The Netherlands
In the Netherlands the pension funds have accumulated funds to the extent of 156% of GDP in 2012 
according to the Towers Watson Global Pensions asset study6 2013. This amounts to Euro 935 
billion.  The  OECD  in  their  Better  Life  statistics7 noted  that  in  the  Netherlands  the  average 
disposable income per household in 2012 was Euro 33,200 with the top 20% receiving Euro 62,648 
and the bottom 20% Euro 14,563 on average.  With slightly over 7.5 million households in the 
Netherlands the total disposable income is close to Euro 250 billion. 
To achieve the objective of transferring some savings from a financial use to its economic one, the 
collective of pension funds could be asked to spend Euro 7.5 billion a year, which is less than 1% of 
their  savings,  as  an  economic  use  injection  for  the  benefit  of  its  savers.  The Euro  7.5  billion 
translates in about Euro 1, 000 per pension saver and beneficiary. If this amount is paid out equally 
to all pension savers and beneficiaries, it will benefit the lowest 20% income group with a 6.87% 
income injection, the average income group with a 3% income injection and the highest income 
group with a 1.6% income injection. If the Dutch government agrees to allow this payment to be 
made tax free, it will create the maximum economic impact.
If the Dutch pension savers are requested to use these funds for consumption spending rather than 
turning them back into financial savings, a boost to domestic demand will be created which will 
have  multiplier  effects  for  the  manufacturing  and  service  sector  industry.  If  such  injection  is 
followed up in subsequent years (probably for no longer than two or three years) and  entrepreneurs 
know that such stimulus will be continued till the Dutch economy is back to its long term growth 
potential,  than the multiplier  effects will  be the strongest. With increasing output and more job 
opportunities the Dutch government’s tax revenues will increase without any change in tax rates. 
The  Dutch  government  will  also  need  fewer  savings  to  fund  its  deficit,  leaving  more  savings 
available for economic purposes. Banks will experience a lower level of doubtful debtors among its 
customer base and the outlook for the housing market becomes more positive as more households 
will be in full employment.
Why would the Dutch  pension  funds wish to  participate  in  such action?  Firstly  pension funds 
benefit if companies do better as share prices will increase. This is a financial gain, but one based 
on real output growth rather than being based on speculation only. Secondly more people will want 
to save with the pension funds as such economic easing exercise can be repeated whenever the 
savings allocation pattern gets out of balance again. Finally the Dutch government could issue a 
short-fall guarantee in case the share price increases would not cover the paid-out amounts, based 
6 http://www.towerswatson.com/en-GB/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-Results/2013/01/Global-Pensions-Asset-
Study-2013
7 http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/netherlands/
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on the 10 year government bond yield developments. Such settlement could be made three years 
after the start of the economic easing exercise. It is unlikely that pension funds will have cash-flow 
problems as a result of these pay-outs as their dividend and interest received will certainly be more 
than 1% of their  portfolio.  However to ease the cash-flow considerations,  the pay-out could be 
staggered into two semi-annual payments of Euro 500 each. Furthermore the ECB could via the 
Dutch  Central  Bank  (DNB)  make  short  term  funds  available  to  those  pension  funds,  which 
experience temporary cash-flow problems. The aim is to avoid having to sell financial assets for 
supporting economic easing.
3.2.2 A cross-border scheme in the Euro area. 
The European central bank (ECB) has as one of its main tasks to protect the value of its currency:  
the Euro. Cross-border economic easing would be one of the best ways to do so for Euro area 
countries.  What  the  ECB has  currently done is  exchanging government  bonds of  various  Euro 
countries into Euro loans for liquidity support. Such support has the same draw back as quantitative 
easing:  it  creates  liquidity  in  the  financial  savings  markets,  but  does  nothing  for  individual 
households. 
 A better alternative would be to create a transfer mechanism to get some financial savings back to 
an economic use.  This could be achieved as follows: the ECB borrows in the international financial 
markets by issuing ECB bonds. Such activity does not create money, but transfers money from one 
type of savings to another. As an example take the case of Spain: the proceeds of such bonds are 
transferred from the ECB to the Bank of Spain, Spain’s central bank. The concept is that Spain’s 
central bank will organise a distribution of the proceeds over all 17.4 million Spanish households. 
Again the principle of an equal amount of cash for each household could be applied. This will help 
the lower income level households more than the more affluent ones. It makes economic sense.
In Spain the current average net household income level runs at Euro 23,123 in 2012 according to 
INE, Spain’s national statistical office8. This is practically 10% less than the 2005 level. To kick 
start  the economy a cash injection  of 4% in year  one over the average  net  household income, 
followed by a lower percentage a year later, would probably be the best approach. Again one fixed 
amount of Euro 925 per households would best be paid to all households, which helps the lowest 
20% of the households the most and the top 20% the least. Total costs Euro 16.1 billion in year 1. 
Again the best approach would be to allow this amount to be paid tax free. The Euro 16 billion is a  
fraction of Spain’s government deficit of Euro 109 billion over 2012, but such deficit has had no 
lasting impact on unemployment levels as it did not deal and could not deal with the substantial 
deterioration  in  individual  households’  average  income  developments.  Cross-border  economic 
easing can make the difference.
The pay back could be arranged out of general tax receipts over a ten year period including a two 
year grace one. The outstanding loan could be paid back in equal instalments over the remainder 
eight years. Of course, the expectation is that with the multiplier effects tax revenues will increase,  
without having to change the tax rates.  For Spain it  does not count as government  debt as the 
Spanish government has not incurred a government deficit to fund this transaction. It is in effect a 
collective  individual  households’  debt  to  be repaid  out of  the tax income generated  out of  the 
increased economic activities of the working population.
The ECB could  issue 10 year  index-linked bonds.  Such bonds could  be linked to  the  average 
inflation rate in the 17 Euro area countries. Such bonds have two advantages over fixed rate bonds. 
8 http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2013/11/spain-household-income-drops-10-to-2005.html
12
                                                                                                         The benign neglect of the individual households’ equity crisis©Drs Kees De Koning
Firstly the ECB makes use of a combined inflation rate from the 17 countries sharing the Euro as 
their currency. Secondly the ECB reduces the risks to all type of investors -institutional or private- 
to see the values of the bonds fluctuate strongly in case the Euro interest rate based on the average 
inflation rate has to be increased. Especially institutional investors will benefit from this as their 
mark-to-market accounting method will not show substantial losses when interest rates rise. For 
both institutional and private investors the positive yield over inflation will bring in a cash flow 
which is more likely to be used in an economic use rather than being kept as a financial saving.
The ECB could repeat the transfer of savings from a financial use to an economic one for other 
Euro area countries, if needed. This could be done especially for those Euro area countries which 
lack the financial resources accumulated in pension funds and life insurance companies.
As a method it will bring home the message to all Euro area citizens, that the ECB is not only there  
to maintain the value of the Euro, but also to stabilise Euro area economies as and when a re-
balancing of an allocation of savings is needed. The Euro as a currency will be strengthened, but not 
unimportantly, Euro area citizens will experience a direct benefit from being a citizen in one of the 
Euro area countries.
3.3 Banking reform
Accounting practises
When savers and equity holders can no longer trust the profit and loss accounts of banks, both 
banks but also their savings providers: the individual households are in trouble. The key error in the 
accounting practises was the lack of accounting recognition of the savings depreciation factor. This 
applied to the financial use of savings to acquire homes: the price increases of the assets over the 
CPI inflation levels as well as the increased use of savings for funding government debt levels: 
another financial use of savings. It sometimes applies to exuberant share price increases.
What  it  means in accounting practises is that factors outside the narrow focus of an individual 
bank’s position are taken into account when assessing the true and fair position of the risks which 
have  been created  by the collective  of  banks and by a  government  through its  deficit  funding 
activities. Such risks should be taken into account. 
The current narrow focus of bank supervisors to penalise individual banks which have helped to 
create the current economic impasse misses the point somewhat as none of the banks were warned 
when they did what they did collectively.  Now retrospectively, they are punished for lending for 
the  financial  use  of  savings,  which  certainly  was  not  a  crime  in  legal  terms  at  the  time  of 
undertaking such activities. It also means that ultimately not the management of the banks, but the 
shareholders -the individual households- pay the fines. One has to decide whether such action is fair 
or not.
Solidity of the banking system: stress tests
In the U.S. stress tests on all banks have been carried out and many banks had to strengthen their 
equity base. The new Volcker rules will mean that the chances of banks dealing for own account 
will  be severely curtailed.  The real  beneficiaries  will  be the risk stakeholders  as under the old 
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system the risk division between the collective individual households who provided the funds and 
the dealers who put these funds out at risk was usually: a gain the dealer wins; a loss the savings 
providers lose. 
In Europe such steps are intended but have not yet been implemented. Many steps have already 
been taken to make the ECB have more influence over the solidity of the banking sector in the 17 
Euro  area  countries.  An  ECB  based  regulatory  authority  is  to  be  established  in  2014.  The 
chairperson  has  already  been  appointed.  A  bank-bailout  fund  will  be  established  with  bank 
contributions stretching over a period of ten years.
Solidity of the banking system: risk partners
The question can be raised why pension funds have a different legal structure than banks and life 
insurance companies. 
The U.K. Pension Regulator  formulates the role and responsibility of a trustee as: “It is the trustees 
Board’s legal duty to make sure that the right processes, systems, people and procedures are in 
place to manage the (pension) scheme, its investments and the risks that can arise.” 
Is it not striking that the Board of a bank has the same responsibilities as those just described for the 
trustee Board of a pension fund. Why is it than, that a Board of a bank has only to report to its  
shareholders meeting rather than to all fund providers? 
In the discussions about banking reform it has already been agreed and even practised like in the 
case of Cyprus, that other groups rather than the shareholders should feel the pain if the Board of a 
bank has made serious mistakes. For instance it has been agreed that subordinated debt holders as 
well as large depositors should pay for the mistakes of bank managements. This all with the aim to 
avoid  another  series  of  government  (or  rather  more  precisely  the  collective  of  individual 
households’)  supported  bail-outs.  It  is  illogical  to  share  losses  without  having  any  say  and 
responsibility over the decisions taken. Losses made by banks are as serious as losses made by 
pension funds.
My suggestion is to gradually convert banks to something more similar to pension funds. This can 
be done by turning banks more into saving entities with an economic purpose. If one introduces 
three different risk categories: shares, subordinated bond and large deposits than it should be logical 
that the rewards warrant a different level of remuneration for each category, but there should be no 
difference in the date of payment. Bank profits should not be assessed before profit distribution, but 
after all risk categories have been paid, including shareholders. Assume shareholders receive a fixed 
interest rate over their shares, payable annually: than such shares are in effect turned into perpetual 
bonds of the highest risk category. The principal amount of the bonds may be lost but as long as the 
bank exists it has to pay out such income flows before declaring its profit levels. Subordinated 
bonds are  the  second risk taking category,  but  of a  lower risk category.  Therefore the interest 
applied should be slightly lower than for “shareholders”. Thirdly large depositors should be made 
aware that their money is also at risk and therefore their interest compensation needs to reflect this. 
Banks should be forced to publish these interest rates on their websites for all to see. For small 
depositors most countries already offer a protection scheme in case a bank fails.
Banks should no longer have “shareholder” meetings, but “risk” holder meetings where all  risk 
holders are represented. The need for additional buffer funds will show up in the “price” of shares 
and subordinated bonds on the stock markets as and when they start trading below par.
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3.4 Government funding structures.
This section is more generally applicable than just for Euro area countries. All governments which 
borrow in the capital markets do so to fund expenditure that exceeds their government revenues. 
Such deficit funding rarely creates a cash-flow for a government in subsequent years. It should be 
highlighted that governments generally do not behave as ordinary borrowers. They continually roll-
over debt on basis of a maturity mismatch. No ordinary household -either as an individual or as a 
company- could arrange such type of borrowing.
For  the  fund providers  -the  savers-  there  are  a  number  of  risks  involved.  The first  risk is  the 
accounting risk. The regulators have decided that government bond values can only be assessed on 
a day by day value base which is the mark-to-market method. For individual holders of government 
bonds such accounting method makes no difference: one may decide to keep the bonds to maturity, 
accepts the interest rate paid over such bonds and does not worry that there may be other bonds in 
the market which pay a higher interest rate. On the other hand for personal cash flow reasons one 
may sell the bonds. For banks and pension funds however, such accounting methods are supposed 
to be essential  in reflecting fair values of assets and liabilities and of future cash outflows and 
inflows. 
The second risk is the risk of inflation. What matters for individual households and thereby for 
companies  supporting Defined Benefit  schemes as well  as for pension funds and life  insurance 
companies is whether the interest rate covers the depreciation/appreciation risks to the value of a 
bond as a consequence of the effects of CPI inflation rates? 
What government bonds should reflect but currently do not reflect is that the collective of savers 
have no option but to stay invested in government bonds for at least 70 or 80 years as any shorter 
period would imply collective economic suicide. The income and savings depreciation factor should 
be  applied  to  the  valuation  of  government  bonds  rather  than  a  daily  assessment  of  a  70  year 
obligation. The higher the level of government debt, the higher the value of the income and savings 
depreciation factor on individual households’ savings and incomes.
On top of this the practice of quantitative easing created the situation that savers had to compete 
against central banks. The latter created money at no cost to these central banks. Each government, 
which depends on savers to provide it with the cash to cover their debts, would know that the higher 
the debt level, the longer it will take to pay off such debt and the longer the commitment of the 
savers need to be to help out governments. Also the longer the income and savings depreciation 
factors will be at work.
Governments require all other financial institutions, such as banks and pension funds to have clear 
cash in and outflow analyses over the total period of their commitments, however governments fail 
to practise for themselves what they preach for others.
How can a one day sales price of a ten year bond reflect a fair value for an uncertain 70 or 80 year  
obligation? How can quantitative easing by central banks be called “fair” as the zero costs of money 
to the issuer does not compare with the economic act of giving up consumption in order to save for 
a future expense? Why do governments not recognise that their use of savings is to a very large 
extent a financial use and does not add to income or output growth after the initial year of spending 
such savings? Why is it that governments’ have difficulties in accepting that economic risks to the 
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individual households: the risks to their real -after  inflation- income levels, affect the economic 
performance of a country? Why do governments not issue all their debt in index-linked bonds? 
Such action would prevent that incomes out of individual households’ savings will be negatively 
affected over the whole period of funding i.e. 70 or 80 years. It would do away with the question of 
fair value as a fixed reward over the prevailing inflation rate is always fair. It may create some 
difficulty for actuaries as future incomes and expenses for pension funds cannot be discounted at a 
fixed rate, as there will be no fixed rate: the rewards for savings will be a continuously floating rate 
based on the CPI inflation levels plus a fixed margin.
Perhaps Parliaments will have some time o discuss such questions as they are vital to an economy.
 3.5 Pension funds contributions to economic growth  
Pension funds,  acting as savings institutions,  have grown in importance  in many countries,  but 
especially in the U.S., the U.K., Switzerland, the Netherlands, Australia and Canada, where apart 
from Canada,  they have  all  reached a  savings  level  equal  or  over  annual  GDP levels  of  their 
respective country.
Such mass accumulation of savings does require serious thoughts about the impact of such savings 
on output and employment growth.
Pension  regulators  seem  more  worried  that  each  fund  has  the  reserves  to  pay  the  committed 
amounts  to  each  fund’s  future  pensioners,  rather  than  encouraging  these  pension  funds  to  act 
collectively in the interest  of an economy.  In the previous sections it  has been spelled out that 
imbalances can arise in which financial savings grow rapidly, but the economic use of such savings 
is negligible. Hopefully pension regulators do not only focus on fair value accounting, based on the 
wrong values of bank shares, based on the wrong maturity of government debt, based on savings 
allocations  to  shares  which  may  reflect  excessive  financial  savings  allocations  which  have  no 
relation to the funds received by companies and based on the notion that individual households need 
to save more otherwise their wish to live relatively happily in retirement cannot be fulfilled.
Perhaps, pension funds themselves individually and collectively through their pension federations 
and  in  concert  with  the  pension  regulators  could  study the  savings  flows  and see  when  a  re-
balancing of such flows is required.
3.6 The path back from quantitative easing
Quantitative easing has taken place in the U.S., the U.K. and in a more indirect way in the Euro 
area. Central banks are now owners or in the case of the ECB stake holders of a substantial share of 
outstanding government debt. Central banks were never created to print money to fund government 
expenditure. They, more than any other organisation, were entrusted with the task to maintain the 
values of their respective currencies and to supervise the financial system with the aim to encourage 
economic growth and full employment. The current situation does not call for recriminations, but 
for positive actions.
To arrange for the portfolio of government bonds to be released back to the private markets a few 
principles may be taken into account.
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The cause of the recent financial crisis in 2008 was the extensive financial use of savings in the 
home mortgage lending process to individual households in the U.S. and the subsequent selling 
method through mortgage backed securities for which the sellers did not maintain a market.
In 2001 the cause of the crisis was mainly the dot.com bubble which was to blame for the short  
recession.
The latest financial crisis seriously affected individual households’ incomes and savings. Therefore 
a main role for central banks is to take measures which avoid the excessive home mortgage growth.  
The national home mortgage portfolios were not created by a single bank, though some banks were 
more aggressive than others. The portfolio was created by the collective of banks in the U.S., and in 
Spain for instance. Therefore a warning system could have been put in place when more than 65% 
of the increase in mortgage lending went into house price rises rather than in new construction.  
Such warning system could work not by raising interest rates, but by making mortgage lenders pay 
for the excess lending. Such system can be quite simple: it  can be a traffic light system to the  
mortgage providers. Green is the light for: keep lending; amber for slow down or you will face 
speeding fines and red for speeding fines, which will be assessed per lending institution on basis of 
their  incremental  home  mortgage  activities.  The  same  warning  system  should  be  applied  to 
investment banks, which refuse to maintain a market in their financial products sold.
The traffic light system avoids individual households overstretching themselves in their borrowings. 
It helps avoid the savings depreciation factor to occur. It also avoids a contagion effect to all market 
participants including real sector companies and individual households who are the ones who to 
have to pay more as a consequence of the higher interest  rates for their  borrowings.  Thirdly it 
avoids banks to have to write off a sizeable portion of their loan portfolios in future years. The latter 
hinder their lending capacity for economic purpose activities.
A system of making banks increase their reserve requirements percentage for home loans when 
house prices rise too fast, has been introduced in Switzerland and is being considered by the Bank 
of  England.  The  draw  back  is  that  it  reduces  the  available  capital  base  for  other  lending 
opportunities, which have nothing to do with house prices. A traffic light system affects the income 
base rather than the equity one of those banks most aggressive in pushing up house prices, but it 
does not affect the more conservative banks. Additional reserve requirements affect all banks.
It is generally accepted that prevention works better than a cure.
The cure chosen by central banks was quantitative easing. The consequence was a serious lowering 
of interest rates, which worked well for those who had financial assets, like hedge funds, but much 
less  well  for  pension  funds  and  life  insurance  companies  and  indirectly  for  companies  which 
supported and still  support  Defined Benefit  pension schemes.  Pension funds and life  insurance 
companies not only have financial assets, but also future liabilities. When a promise of an inflation 
proof pension pay-out has been promised -a promise which governments widely practice for their 
own civil  servants  and  members  of  parliaments-  than  the  liabilities  require  an  above  inflation 
revenues flow over the assets. The only way to ensure such above inflation rewards is to change the 
rewards  over  the  debt  portfolio  of  the largest  borrower in  a  country with the longest  maturity 
schedule: government debt. In the U.S. and in the U.K. both governments have issued index-linked 
(also called inflation-linked) government bonds. In the Euro area France, Germany and Italy have 
done so.
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To avoid the mark-to-market losses, which are inevitable for existing fixed rate government bond 
portfolios as soon as interest rates have been raised, the central banks can make a debt swap with 
the government debt issuer in order to turn the currently held fixed rate portfolios into inflation-
linked government bonds. The latter bonds are much more in character with the long term funding 
needs of governments and reduce the risks to the long term bond holders such as pension funds and 
life insurance companies. If one takes a 1% over CPI inflation as a benchmark for a 70-80 year  
government debt obligation than for the U.S., the U.K. and for the Netherlands than the evidence 
suggests9 that for nearly every year over the last 25 years, such inflation-linked bonds would have 
been cheaper for the respective government and thereby for the collective of individual households.
4 Conclusions
The use of the savings depreciation factor will improve both the true and fair value of the accounts  
of banks and pension funds, but it will also be an excellent guide for policy makers to realise when 
the benign neglect factor starts to affect the economic performance of a country. The distinction of 
economic savings and financial ones will help in this process.
There are ways out of the current economic impasse when one focuses on the real victims of an 
economic crisis, the young, the unemployed and those individuals with a low savings or no savings 
level. These groups suffer more than most as they have to rely more on outside equity than other 
groups and usually have lower income levels to support such outside equity.
Rather than relying on central banks to print money, a key solution is to use the savings which are 
in the system already, but re-direct such savings from a financial use to an economic use: economic 
easing. The negative aspects of quantitative easing can thereby be avoided. A fixed amount of cash 
allocated to each pension saver in countries which have substantial savings in their pension funds, 
helps the lower income classes and the unemployed more than the richer ones, but make perfect 
economic sense. In countries without a sizeable pension system, the ECB could undertake such a 
role for the Euro area countries, by borrowing in the capital markets, making this available in the 
countries most in need, and recuperating these funds from the increase in future tax payments from 
the country concerned.
The might of the financial use of savings can be tamed and turned to the economic advantage of all  
if collectively governments and central banks take actions as and when required.
Drs Kees De Koning
Chorleywood, U.K.
29th January 2013
E-mail: keesdekoning008@hotmail.com
9 http://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/48889.html
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